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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Three events in the past year significantly impacted the way the
legal system treats children. First, the family court experiment be-
ing conducted under the auspices of the Supreme Court of Virginia
and the Judicial Council was concluded. Second, the General As-
sembly established a state-wide, community-based, inter-agency
system to deliver services to children and youth. Third, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court promulgated the first set of statewide rules
governing proceedings in juvenile and domestic relations district
courts. The year's other developments were not as systemic or far
reaching as those above, although recommendations flowing from
the Youth Services Commission's' legislatively-mandated study of
services and violent juvenile crime have the potential to impact the
way this highly visible problem is dealt with in the future.2
II. FAMILY COURT EXPERIMENT
The family court experiment effectively began over four decades
ago with a 1950 report by the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council
mandated by the legislature's enactment of Senate Bill 175 in
1948.1 That report, which led to the enactment of the first compre-
hensive juvenile code in Virginia, inched in the direction of a state-
wide system of juvenile and domestic relations courts, but declined
to recommend that family courts "should at [that] time be made
courts of record as provided for in Senate Bill 175."'4 Over the
years, a state-wide system of juvenile and domestic relations dis-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1959,
Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. As of July 1, 1992, the Youth Services Commission became the Virginia Commission on
Youth, and its membership expanded from eight to twelve members. Act of April 6, 1992,
ch. 778, 1992 Va. Acts 1216 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 9-292, -293, -294 (Cum. Supp.
1992)).
2. H.J. Res. 36, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sets. 1992).
3. REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON THE JUVENILE AND DOMES-
Tic RELATIONS COURTS AND SENATE BILL 175, S. Doc. No. 9 (1950).
4. Id. at 6.
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trict courts gradually developed, but the courts were still courts
not of record and appeals were still tried de novo in the circuit
courts. This structure generated much criticism because it lacked
finality and stability in deciding family disputes.5
When the juvenile code was comprehensively revised in 1977, the
focus on its revision engendered more discussion of creating a fam-
ily court as a court of record, and legislative resolutions endorsed a
study of such a concept.' The ensuing study was conducted by the
Family Court Subcommittee of the Virginia Advisory Legislative
Council Committee to Study Services to Youthful Offenders. A
further recommendation was made in 1978 to convene a joint legis-
lative subcommittee "to develop appropriate legislation which ad-
dresses the operational and legal problems which exist in the pre-
sent division of responsibility between juvenile and circuit courts
with regard to domestic relations matters."'7 The subcommittee
was formed, met twice, took no further action, and made no
recommendations.
In 1983 the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court and the
Judicial Council appointed the Committee on Adjudication of
Family Law Matters to examine problems caused by the division
of family law matters between juvenile and circuit courts. This
committee later reported to the Judicial Council, describing cer-
tain enumerated problems and recommending the creation of a
family court system in Virginia, with the family court itself to be
established as a division of the circuit court. The Judicial Council
took this recommendation under advisement, held several public
hearings around the state, and issued a report in 1985 on the Adju-
dication of Family Law Matters in Virginia's Courts." The council
recommended that the General Assembly create an experimental
family court system on a pilot basis to evaluate the efficacy of such
a change in the court system. In 1989, legislation directed the Judi-
cial Council to establish several pilot family courts, to evaluate
their operation, and to report to the Governor and to the General
5. See, e.g., Frederick P. Aucamp, A Family Court for Virginia, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 885
(1979); R.P. Zehler & C. Ridley Bain, The Appeal De Novo in Virginia's Juvenile Court:
Time for a Change?, VA. B. ASS'N J. Summer 1978, at 17.
6. S.J. Res. No. 12, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1976); S.J. Res. No. 91, Va. Gen. As-
sembly (Reg. Sess. 1977).
7. REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ON SERVICES TO YOUTHFUL OF-
FENDERS, S. Doc. No. 24, pg. 12 (1978).
8. REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE STUDYING THE ADJUDICATION OF FAMILY LAW MAT-
TERS IN VIRGINIA'S COURTS (1985) (on file with U. RICH. L. REV.).
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Assembly by December 31, 1992.1 Pilot family courts were estab-
lished at the juvenile court level in Albemarle, Fairfax, and Lou-
doun counties, and in the cities of Alexandria, Chesapeake, and
Lynchburg. They were established at the circuit court level in Roa-
noke City and the counties of Mecklenburg, Roanoke and Smyth.
In those jurisdictions the pilot courts heard the matters normally
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic relations dis-
trict court, as well as a percentage of the divorce, annulment, and
affirmation of marriage cases. The circuit courts in Arlington and
Pulaski counties and the counterpart courts in each of these "test"
jurisdictions served as "control courts" for research purposes. The
experiment lasted from January 1, 1990, until December 31, 1991.
The Judicial Council has been charged with evaluating the experi-
ment and making the required report with its findings to the Gen-
eral Assembly and Governor by the end of 1992.10
III. COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES ACT FOR AT-RISK YOUTH AND
FAMILIES
The Virginia General Assembly's 1992 enactment of the Com-
prehensive Services Act for At-Risk Youth and Families11 marks
an important milestone along the road toward a more effective de-
livery of services to children and youth in the state. Resulting from
a study by the Council of Community Services for Youth and Fam-
ilies, including the operation of pilot programs in five diverse local-
ities around the state,12 the Act will be implemented in several
stages over the next few years. The purposes of the legislation are
(1) to preserve families, (2) to deliver services to children and their
families in the least restrictive environment, (3) to promote early
identification of and intervention with children and families who
are at risk of emotional and behavioral problems, (4) to increase
interagency collaboration and improve family involvement in treat-
ment, (5) to provide greater flexibility in the use of funds, and (6)
9. Act of Mar. 27, 1989, ch. 641, 1989 Va. Acts 1045 (codified at VA. CODE ANN §§ 16.1-
241.1, -296.1, 17-116.05:5, 20-96.1, 20-96.2 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1992)).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96.2 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
11. Acts of Apr. 15, 1992, chs. 837, 880, 1992 Va. Acts 1560, 1647 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.1-1.7, 9-6.25:1, 16.1-276.5, -286, -294, 22.1-101.1, 37.1-197.1, 63.1-55, -248.6, 66-14,
-35 (Cure. Supp. 1992)).
12. The study area included the RADCO Planning District (the City of Fredericksburg
and the counties of Caroline, King George, Spotsylvania and Stafford) a grouping of the
cities of Lynchburg and Bedford along with Bedford County, and the cities of Norfolk,
Richmond, and Roanoke.
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to direct both funding and accountability for service decisions to
local communities.' 3 The program, as it is fully implemented over
three biennia, will pool local and state funds from the Depart-
ments of Education, Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Sub-
stance Abuse Services, Social Services, and Youth and Family Ser-
vices to target those children and youth in need of treatment
services. The program is not predicated on fitting the child into a
category of eligibility, and will base treatment on the child's identi-
fied needs. The program places a premium on the development of
innovative programs and on the delivery of services in the commu-
nity rather than in institutions.
IV. JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISTRICT COURT RULES
On July 1, 1992, the first set of rules promulgated to govern pro-
ceedings in state juvenile and domestic relations district courts
went into force as Part Eight of the Rules of the Virginia Supreme
Court. The rules are intended to "apply to all proceedings in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts."' 4 Some of the
rules, notably Rules 8:7,'1 8:9,1 8:12,1' 8:13,1s 8:14,19 8:19,20
and 8:20,21 are based on and essentially track previously existing
circuit and general district court rules. Rules 8:222 (definitions) and
8:821 (pleadings) track the counterpart rules of the circuit and gen-
eral district courts. However, the former contains slight modifica-
13. THE COUNCIL ON COMMUNITY SERVICES FOR YOUTH & FAMILIES, IMPROVING CARE FOR
TROUBLED & "AT RISK" YOUTH & THEIR FAMILIES iv (1992). This pamphlet summarizes the
report and recommendations of the Council on Community Services for Youth & Families.
14. VA. SuP. CT. R. 8:1.
15. Id. 8:7(a). This rule requires all documents filed in any clerk's office in any proceeding
pursuant to the rules or statutes be eight and one-half by eleven inches in size.
16. Id. 8:9. The court has the power to review and correct any procedures in the clerk's
office touching the filing of pleadings or the maturation of suits; this includes the power to
extend the time allowed to file.
17. Id. 8:12. The court may use electronic or photographic means to preserve the record
or parts thereof.
18. Id. 8:13. This rule focuses on the formalities of requesting subpoenas for witnesses
and subpoenas duces tecum.
19. Id. 8:14. This rule addresses continuances, how they are granted, when they are re-
quested, and the procedures to be followed if all parties either agree or disagree to the
continuance.
20. Id. 8:19. This rule focuses on drafts of orders prepared by counsel and how they are to
be endorsed. It also grants the court discretion to disperse with or modify the rule.
21. Id. 8:20. All appeals must be in writing and will be noted only upon timely receipt in
the clerk's office.
22. Id. 8:2. This rule sets forth statutory and additional definitions.
23. Id. 8:8.
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tions in its citation to the definitions in Virginia Code section 16.1-
228,24 and the latter differs somewhat from corresponding rules, re-
flecting the fact that formal responsive pleadings are rare in juve-
nile courts.2 5 Also, Rule 8:8(c) pertains to types of proceedings that
are unique to the juvenile and domestic relations district court.26
Other rules are basically straightforward and will have little im-
pact on current proceedings in juvenile courts. For cases arising
under Virginia Code section 16.1-278, Rule 8:3 delineates the
pleadings and procedures to be followed in proceedings to order
services, 27 matters to seek judicial consent to emergency surgical or
medical treatment for a minor, 28 and in proceedings for support.29
Rule 8:4 clarifies the service of process to be utilized when seeking
to reduce support arrearages to a judgment,30 and Rule 8:5 incor-
porates the procedure followed in many courts by requiring that all
court-ordered reports be mailed to counsel of record upon request,
including to parties appearing pro se.1 Rule 8:10 provides the
method of making a motion to transfer venue pursuant to Virginia
Code section 16.1-243, 2 and Rule 8:11 essentially tracks General
District Court Rule 7A:4, but distinguishes proceedings that are
confidential under the juvenile code from those that are open to
the public.3 Rule 8:16 follows the procedure already used in many
juvenile courts across the Commonwealth by establishing a uni-
form arraignment procedure in delinquency cases.3 4 Rule 8:21 reit-
erates the Code requirements that proceedings for the violation of
court orders are governed by the due process requirements applica-
ble to the original cases.3 Rule 8:22 describes the procedure to be
followed when judicial consent is sought under unusual conditions,
as where consent for emergency surgery or other medical treatment
is necessary and is given over the telephone. 6
24. Id. 8:2(a).
25. See id. 8:8(a)-(c).
26. Id. 8:3. These are delinquency, child in need of services, child in need of supervision
and status offense proceedings.
27. Id. 8:3(a).
28. Id. 8:3(b).
29. Id. 8:3(c).
30. Id. 8:4.
31. Id. 8:5.
32. Id. 8:10.
33. Id. 8:11.
34. Id. 8:16.
35. Id. 8:21.
36. Id. 8:22.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Rule 8:6 defines, for the first time, the differing roles of attor-
neys serving as counsel and as guardians ad litem in juvenile courts
in Virginia. Virginia Code section 16.1-266 specifies that a child (1)
alleged to be delinquent, (2) in need of supervision, or (3) in need
of services is entitled to be represented by counsel, either retained
or appointed, in proceedings in the juvenile court.-7 The same sec-
tion says that a child alleged to be abused or neglected, or who is
the subject of proceedings for the termination of residual parental
rights or for approval of an entrustment agreement or other means
of being relieved of custody, has the right to a guardian ad litem,
who must be "a discreet and competent attorney-at-law .... 1-38
This section also gives the court the discretionary power to appoint
a guardian ad litem for a child in any other proceedings, with some
restrictions for custody cases, without elaboration. 9 However, no
statute defines the two roles that an attorney in the juvenile court
may play, or distinguishes between them. Rule 8:6 says that the
"guardian ad litem shall vigorously represent the child, fully pro-
tecting the child's interest and welfare" and "shall advise the court
of the wishes of the child in any case where [those] wishes . . .
conflict with the opinion of the guardian ad litem as to what is in
the child's interest and welfare."40 It thus builds on the recent de-
cisions of the Virginia Supreme Court and the Virginia Court of
Appeals addressing the authority of the guardian ad litem in a very
expansive fashion.41
The first part of the rule addresses the role of "counsel" in a
much more cryptic fashion, defining it as "the representation of
the child's legitimate interests. ' 42 Omitted from the final rule is a
sentence from the drafting committee's version, subsequently de-
leted by the Rules Committee of the Judicial Council, providing
that "in general the determination of the child's legitimate inter-
ests in the proceedings is ultimately the responsibility of the child
after full consultation with counsel notwithstanding the wishes of
the parents or what counsel may believe to be in the child's inter-
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
38. Id. § 16.1-266(B).
39. Id. § 16.1-266(D).
40. VA. SuP. CT. R. 8:6 (emphasis added).
41. See Stanley v. Fairfax County Dept. of Social Servs., 10 Va. App. 596, 395 S.E.2d 199
(1990), afl'd, 242 Va. 60, 405 S.E.2d 60 (1991); Norfolk Div. of Social Servs. v. Unknown
Father, 2 Va. App. 420, 345 S.E.2d 533 (1986); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Legal Issues
Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 773, 778 (1991).
42. VA. SuP. CT. R. 8:6 (emphasis added).
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est and welfare."4 3 However, despite the omission the comment ac-
companying Rule 8:6 points out that the rule's language is in-
tended "to track that of the ABA Standards and Virginia case
law."' 44 As there is no Virginia case law elaborating on the role of
counsel, as opposed to that of the guardian ad litem, the ABA
Standards are more helpful. The phrase "legitimate interests" is
derived from Standard 3.1(a) of the IJA-ABA Standards Relating
to Counsel for Private Parties,45 and is given substance by 3.1(b):
Determination of client's interests.
(i) Generally.
In general, determination of the client's interests in the proceed-
ings, and hence the plea to be entered, is ultimately the responsibil-
ity of the client after full consultation with the attorney.
(ii) Counsel for the juvenile.
[a] Counsel for the respondent in a delinquency or in need of
supervision proceeding should .ordinarily be bound by the cli-
ent's definition of his or her interests with respect to admission
or denial of the facts or conditions alleged. It is appropriate
and desirable for counsel to advise the client concerning the
probable success and consequences of adopting any posture
with respect to those proceedings.
[b] Where counsel is appointed to represent a juvenile subject
to child protective proceedings, and the juvenile is capable of
considered judgment on his or her behalf, determination of the
client's interest in the proceeding should ultimately remain the
client's responsibility, after full consultation with counsel.
[c] In delinquency and in need of supervision proceedings,
where it is locally permissible to so adjudicate very young per-
sons, and in child protective proceedings, the respondent may
be incapable of considered judgment in his or her own behalf.
[1] Where a guardian ad litem has been appointed, pri-
mary responsibility for determination of the posture of
the case rests with the guardian and the juvenile.
[2] Where a guardian ad litem has not been appointed,
the attorney should ask that one be appointed.
43. See Proposed Rule 7D:6, Rules for Practice Before Juvenile and Domestic Relations
District Courts, VA. LAW WKLY., Aug. 13, 1990, gt 180.
44. VA. SuP. CT. R. 8:6 cmt.
45. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE
PARTIES 77 (1980).
19921 803
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[3] Where a guardian ad litem has not been appointed
and, for some reason, it appears that independent advice
to the juvenile will not otherwise be available, counsel
should inquire thoroughly into all circumstances that a
careful and competent person in the juvenile's position
should consider in determining the juvenile's interests
with respect to the proceeding. After consultation with
the juvenile, the parents (where their interests do not ap-
pear to conflict with the juvenile's), and any other family
members or interested persons, the attorney may remain
neutral concerning the proceeding, limiting participation
to presentation and examination of material evidence or,
if necessary, the attorney may adopt the position requir-
ing the least intrusive intervention justified by the juve-
nile's circumstances.
(iii) Counsel for the parent.
It is appropriate and desirable for an attorney to consider all cir-
cumstances, including the apparent interests of the juvenile, when
counseling and advising a parent who is charged in a child protec-
tive proceeding or who is seeking representation during a delin-
quency or in need of supervision proceeding. The posture to be
adopted with respect to the facts and conditions alleged in the pro-
ceeding, however, remains ultimately the responsibility of the
client.4
6
The position implied in Rule 8:6, and made more explicit in Stan-
dard 3:1, is that "a lawyer should represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law."'47
Rule 8:15 greatly expands on the availability of discovery in ju-
venile and domestic relations district courts. It entitles juveniles
charged with those delinquent acts that would be felonies if com-
mitted by adults, and those involved in transfer hearings, along
with the prosecutors, to the same discovery rights that apply in
circuit court pursuant to Rule 3A:11. 48 It also accords the same dis-
covery rights to juveniles facing misdemeanor delinquency charges
46. Id. at 79-80. The commentary accompanying the Standard contains a more complete
discussion of particular problems, like that of the incompetent juvenile, but it continues to
take a strong advocacy position. It should be noted that the guardian ad litem referred to in
the rule is generally a non-lawyer in other jurisdictions, and that appears to be the premise
upon which the Standard is based.
47. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1; see also ECs 7-7, 7-11, &
7-12 (1990), reprinted in 39:2 VA. LAW. REG. 16-18 (Aug. 1990).
48. VA. SuP. CT. R. 8:15(b).
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that an adult misdemeanant would have in general district court
under Rule 7C:5. 49 In all other proceedings, the judge has the dis-
cretion, upon motion, to enter any orders in aid of discovery that
could be entered under Part Four of the Virginia Supreme Court
Rules, except that depositions cannot be taken.50
Rule 8:17 mandates that the judge far more extensively advise
the juvenile of rights at trial at the initial court appearance in a
delinquency case. The judge must advise the youth of the right to
counsel, the right to a public hearing, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
the right to present evidence, and the right to appeal any final
court decision. Any waiver of the right to counsel, the right to a
public hearing, and of the privilege against self-incrimination can
be granted only after the judge determines that the waiver is
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made "after a thorough
inquiry [and finding by the court] that the juvenile is capable of
making an intelligent and understanding decision in light of the
child's age, mental condition, education, and experience, consider-
ing the nature and complexity of the case."51 The rule thus would
seem to require a fairly extensive colloquy between the judge and
the juvenile, including inquiries that are tailored to the child's in-
dividual characteristics, such as the existence of a learning disabil-
ity, mental retardation, or the like.
Rule 8:18 makes clear that the permissible pleas in a delin-
quency case are "guilty," "not guilty," "nolo contendere," or "no
plea," the last to be treated as a denial of the allegations.52 Again,
the rule requires a searching inquiry into the voluntariness, under-
standing, and intelligence of a juvenile's plea of guilty.
These rules will ensure greater uniformity and regularity among
juvenile and domestic relations district courts around the Com-
monwealth, and will guarantee a higher level of protection for the
juvenile's due process rights in delinquency proceedings. 3
49. Id.
50. Id. 8:15(c).
51. Id. 8:17.
52. Id. 8:18.
53. It is highly appropriate that this heightened attention to due process occurs during
the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court
decision In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This ruling first articulated the due process rights of
juveniles.
1992]
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V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
A. Decisions
The first capital murder case involving a death sentence for a
juvenile defendant in about half a century reached the Virginia Su-
preme Court in 1992. In Thomas v. Commonwealth,54 the court af-
firmed the conviction and death penalty for a youth who was sev-
enteen at the time of his offense. The court found that the young
man validly and legally waived a transfer hearing under Virginia
Code section 16.1-270, and that the trial court did not err when it
denied a change of venue . The court also found that no violation
of the double jeopardy clause arose from prosecuting Thomas for
the capital murder of one victim after accepting his guilty plea to
the first degree murder of the other victim, despite the fact that
the capital murder prosecution was predicated in part on proof of
the other murder.5 The court upheld the trial court's denial of a
continuance to the youth's initial court-appointed counsel, and
also affirmed the trial court's action in relieving that attorney from
the case for his inability to be prepared for trial on the scheduled
date. "' In light of the testimony of the prosecution expert and the
interrogating officer, Thomas' confession was also deemed volunta-
rily and intelligently made, in spite of his age, alleged developmen-
tal immaturity, and lack of sleep. The waiver of his Miranda rights
was similarly deemed to be proper.5 8 No error was committed, nor
did prejudice occur, when the police failed to preserve marijuana
found in a "baggie" in Thomas' room even though allegedly it was
laced with PCP and had been smoked by the youth prior to the
killings. 9
The court also concluded that, in capital cases involving
juveniles being tried as adults, Virginia's capital murder statutes,
Code sections 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, take precedence over section
16.1-272, thus requiring jury sentencing as provided by the former
and not sentencing by the judge as mandated in the juvenile
code."' The court upheld the death sentence based on the "vile-
ness" predicate, and affirmed the death sentence without discuss-
54. 244 Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 606 (1992).
55. Id. at 7-11, 419 S.E.2d at 609-12.
56. Id. at 8-10, 419 S.E.2d at 610-11.
57. Id. at 12-13, 419 S.E.2d at 612-13.
58. Id. at 14-16, 419 S.E.2d at 613-14.
59. Id. at 16-18, 419 S.E.2d at 614-16.
60. Id. at 21-23, 419 S.E.2d at 617-18.
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ing whether the penalty is appropriate for a person who was a ju-
venile at the time of the offense.61 By permitting the execution of
juveniles, Virginia is one of a minority of states in a nation that is
joined at the present time only by Iraq and Iran in sanctioning the
juvenile death penalty.62
In Duarte v. Commonwealth,"3 the court of appeals upheld as
valid a search of a student's dormitory room by private college offi-
cials because the search, and the consequent seizure of marijuana,
were not under the direction of state officials. 4 Although Duarte
was not a minor, the holding may be instructive in similar cases of
searches involving juveniles.
In Bassett v. Commonwealth, 5 the court concluded that the
trial court had considered the transferred juvenile defendant's age,
mental deficiency, and low academic skills as mitigating factors
prior to imposing the maximum sentences for second degree mur-
der and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.6
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, ruled in Lavinder v. Com-
monwealth67 that in cases involving non-constitutional error, the
harmless error test to be applied is whether the verdict would have
been the same had the error not occurred. The error in this case
was the admission during cross-examination of the defendant's ju-
venile adjudications, a violation of the juvenile code's prohibitions
against such practice. The court ruled that the error was not harm-
less in light of the closeness of the evidence in the case.",
61. Id. at 24-25, 419 S.E.2d at 619-20.
62. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kenneth
E. Gewerth & Clifford K. Dome, Imposing the Death Penalty on Juvenile Murderers: A
Constitutional Assessment, 75 JUDICATURE 6 (1991); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CAN CHIL-
DREN BE EXECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES? (1990). Since the Amnesty International flyer
was issued, two other nations listed, Bangladesh and Barbados, have ratified the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons under the age of 18. Merrill Sobie, Rights of the Child Charged with
Violating the Law, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 315 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A.
Davidson eds., 1990).
63. 12-Va. App. 1023, 407 S.E.2d 41 (1991).
64. Id. at 1026-27, 407 S.E.2d at 42-43.
65. 13 Va. App. 580, 414 S.E.2d 419 (1992).
66. Id. at 583, 414 S.E.2d at 421.
67. 12 Va. App. 1003, 407 S.E.2d 910 (1991).
68. A panel of the court had already ruled that the admission of the juvenile adjudica-
tions was erroneous, and the Attorney General did not challenge this finding. Id. at 1007 n.2,
407 S.E.2d at 912 n.2; see Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 395 S.E.2d 211 (1990), noted in Rob-
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In Kluis v. Commonwealth,9 the court of appeals opined that
the fact that a juvenile is emancipated cannot, standing alone, jus-
tify the transfer of the youth from the juvenile court to the circuit
court for trial as an adult.10 However, the facts in the case were
sufficient to support the conclusions of the juvenile court and the
circuit court that Kluis was not amenable to treatment as a
juvenile.71
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in United States
v. R.L.C. 2 that where the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act limits
incarceration to the "maximum term that would be authorized" if
the youth were sentenced as an adult, the proper reference is to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines and not to the statutory
maximum for the offense. 3 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ruled in United States v. Romulus74 that
before a district court may transfer a juvenile for prosecution as an
adult, the court must make findings on the record with respect to
each factor that must be considered under the statute. 5
B. Legislation
Legislative changes enacted by the Virginia General Assembly at
its 1992 session included specifying that no appeal bond need be
filed to appeal a juvenile court judgment, except in support arrear-
age cases or for orders suspending payment of support during ap-
peal.716 Section 16.1-242 of the Code was amended to provide that a
defendant who reaches the age of twenty-one without being prose-
cuted shall be tried as an adult, even though a juvenile when the
ert E. Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U.
RIcH. L. REV. 773, 781 (1991).
69. 14 Va. App. -, 418 S.E.2d 908 (1992).
70. Id. at -, 418 S.E.2d at 909.
71. Id. at -, 418 S.E.2d at 909.
72. 112 S.Ct. 1329 (1992).
73. Id. at 1338. See 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) (1988) for the relevant provision in the
Juvenile Delinquency Act.
74. 949 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1991).
75. id. at 716; see 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
76. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 565, 1992 Va. Acts 726 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-107
(Cum. Supp. 1992)). This clarifies the question presented in Casey v. Hopewell Dept. of
Social Servs., 14 Va. App. 222, 415 S.E.2d 878 (1992), wherein the court of appeals con-
cluded that an appeal bond was not required in an appeal from an order terminating paren-
tal rights.
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offense was committed.77 The Assembly also clarified the ability of
juvenile and domestic relations district courts, and other courts, to
transfer cases to the appropriate court with exclusive jurisdiction.
Other enactments further limit the circumstances under which a
juvenile may be held temporarily in adult custody7 and require
that notice of a detention hearing, or a detention review hearing,
must be given to the Commonwealth's Attorney. 0
Amendments to section 16.1-260 clarify that a juvenile court in-
take officer has unreviewable discretion to refuse a petition in cases
alleging that a child is (1) in need of services, (2) in need of super-
vision, (3) a status offender, or (4) delinquent for committing a
misdemeanor less than Class 1. This section has also been
amended to provide that where a magistrate issues a warrant for a
juvenile upon review of an intake decision not to file a petition in a
Class 1 misdemeanor of felony situation, a petition must then be
issued based on the warrant."' The "abuse and lose" provision con-
tained in the disposition section of the Code was amended once
again to include the unlawful use or possession of a handgun, and
public intoxication under a local ordinance, along with the previ-
ously included alcohol and drug offenses, as warranting a driver's
license sanction. 2 Fifteen-year-olds are now eligible for serious of-
fender treatment under the juvenile code,88 greater restrictions
77. Act of May 27, 1992, ch. 509, 1992 Va. Acts 645 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-242
(Cum. Supp. 1992)). Two problems may be presented here: where the prosecutor delays
indictment until after the juvenile turns 21, and where a juvenile commits an offense prior
to the effective date of the statute and is later prosecuted under the section after turning 21.
In the latter situation, the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Juvenile Male, 819 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1987), deeming such a change substantive and a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3, would seem to be
persuasive.
78. Act of Mar. 27, 1992, ch. 496, 1992 Va. Acts 636 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-245
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
79. Acts of Apr. 5 & Apr. 15, 1992, chs. 728, 830, 1992 Va. Acts 1107, 1475 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-247 (Cure. Supp. 1992)).
80. Act of Mar. 27, 1992, ch. 508, 1992 Va. Acts 644 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-
250, -250.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
81. Acts of Mar. 27, Mar. 30, & Mar. 30, 1992, chs. 502, 527, & 542, 1992 Va. Acts 639,
669, 684 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
82. Acts of Apr. 4, Apr. 5 & Apr. 15, 1992, chs. 701, 736, 830, 1992 Va. Acts 1061, 1115,
1475 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.9 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
83. Act of Mar. 26, 1992, ch. 484, 1992 Va. Acts 617 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
285.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)). The amendment is not as harsh as it initially seems. Since fif-
teen-year-olds were eligible for transfer to the adult court, but not for serious offender treat-
ment prior to this General Assembly action, see VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Repl. Vol.
1989), some of the younger offenders were allegedly transferred because of the lack of the
stronger juvenile sanction.
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were inserted to limit placement of youths in out-of-state facili-
ties, 84 and section 16.1-291 was amended to clarify that a court has
the power to modify the terms of probation, protective supervision,
and parole orders rather than merely to revoke the status.8 5 Other
amendments to the juvenile code include giving the Virginia Work-
ers' Compensation Commission access to juvenile disposition or-
ders for evaluating whether to make an award for the victim of a
crime"' and the addition of a new Article 13.2 allowing the estab-
lishment of privately operated juvenile detention homes or other
secure facilities.8
Amendments to Titles 18.2 and 19.2 relevant to juveniles include
expansion of prohibitions against false identification cards,88 provi-
sions allowing for the forfeiture of driver's licenses in drug cases,89
further amendments strengthening the penalties for the distribu-
tion of drugs to minors,90 expansion of the purposes for which a
restricted driver's license may be issued to one convicted of driving
while intoxicated to include travel to and from school,9' increasing
the penalty for furnishing a handgun to a minor, 2 and expansion
of eligibility for placement in the Boot Camp Incarceration Pro-
gram to include juveniles tried as adults by eliminating the mini-
mum age of eighteen for such incarceration. '
84. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 732, 1992 Va. Acts 1111 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-286
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
85. Act of Mar. 2, 1992, ch. 90, 1992 Va. Acts 96 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-291
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
86. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 547, 1992 Va. Acts 699 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-
305, 19.2-368.3 (Cune. Supp. 1992)).
87. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 652, 1992 Va. Acts 958 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-
322.5 through -322.7 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
88. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 531, 1992 Va. Acts 672 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-
204.2, 46.2-347 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
89. Acts of Mar. & Apr. 15, 1992, chs. 58, 833, 1992 Va. Acts 56, 1493 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-251, -259.1, 46.2-390.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)). A juvenile may not suffer a
double forfeiture under both these sections and § 16.1-278.9. Id.
90. Acts of Apr. 4 & Apr. 5, 1992, chs. 708, 724, 1992 Va. Acts 1075, 1104 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-255 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
91. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 559, 1992 Va. Acts 713 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
92. Act of Mar. 26, 1992, ch. 487, 1992 Va. Acts 618 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-309
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
93. Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch. 861, 1992 Va. Acts 1625 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
316.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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VI. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE, AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Abuse and Neglect
1. Decisions
The most significant legal development in the area of child abuse
and neglect was the decision of the court of appeals in Jackson v.
W.94 reversing a circuit court judgment declaring the Department
of Social Services' child abuse and neglect guidelines to be uncon-
stitutional. The court of appeals concluded that the Commissioner
of the Department had the authority to issue "guidelines" that did
not rise to the level of "regulations," which would require a more
formal adoption process, and that the definitions of emotional
abuse and mental injury in those guidelines were not unconstitu-
tionally vague or overbroad." The court also found that the proce-
dures used to determine if a complaint of child abuse or neglect
was "founded" complied with the requirements of administrative
due process."
In Turner v. Jackson,97 the court likewise upheld an administra-
tive determination, sustained by a court on review, that a child
abuse complaint was "founded." The court concluded that the
statutory and guideline definitions of "physical abuse" were not
unconstitutionally vague, and that the procedures for challenging
determinations of abuse comply with due process and use the
proper standards of proof. 8 In Aquino v. Stone9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly refused to order
the Secretary of the Army to amend records of a criminal investi-
gation of an Army officer's suspected child sexual abuse.
In White v. Illinois,100 the United States Supreme Court again
addressed the requirements of the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment in the context of a criminal prosecution for
child abuse. The statements by a four-year-old sexual assault vic-
tim to her babysitter, her mother, an investigating police officer, an
emergency room nurse, and a doctor, all of which were admissible
94. 14 Va. App. -, 419 S.E.2d 385 (1992).
95. Id. at , 419 S.E.2d at 389-93.
96. Id. at , 419 S.E.2d at 393-96.
97. 14 Va. App. -, 417 S.E.2d 881 (1992).
98. Id. at -, 417 S.E.2d at 889-90.
99. 957 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1992).
100. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
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under state law hearsay exceptions as spontaneous declarations or
as statements in the course of medical treatment, could be admit-
ted through those persons as witnesses even though the govern-
ment did not produce the victim at trial or prove that she was
"'unavailable."101
The childhood sexual abuse statute enacted in 1991 by the Gen-
eral Assembly did not fare well in the courts during the year since
its passage. 102 The Virginia Supreme Court concluded in Starnes v.
Cayouette03 that the provision permitting retroactive revival of
civil sexual abuse claims that had been barred by the prior statute
of limitations was unconstitutional as a denial of due process. 04 In
Foreign Mission Board v. Wade, 06 the court reversed a judgment
against the Board in favor of the wife and child of a foreign mis-
sionary for the missionary's sexual abuse of his daughter, and
other daughters, based on an alleged oral contract with the Board
by which it agreed to protect the family from harm. This agree-
ment did not create a contractual duty to protect the wife and
daughters from illegal acts by the father-employee. 0 6
In Jacobson v. United States,07 the United States Supreme
Court held that the prosecution did not establish that the defend-
ant was predisposed, prior to the first contact by the government,
to commit the offense of securing child pornography through the
mail, and the actions of government agents thus amounted to
entrapment.
Three cases involving illegal sexual acts with minors were de-
cided by the Virginia Court of Appeals during the past year. In
Clark v. Commonwealth,"'0 the court concluded that the defendant
teacher's supervisory authority over the student-victim was not
sufficient to supply the necessary intimidation to sustain a convic-
101. Id. at 743. See the discussions of Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), and Maryland
v. Craig 497 U.S. 836 (1990), in Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Legal Issues Involving Children:
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 629, 631-33 (1990).
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Cumn. Supp. 1992). See the discussion of the statute in
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
25 U. RICH. L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1991).
103. 244 Va. 202, 419 S.E.2d 669 (1992).
104. Id. at 205-13, 419 S.E.2d at 671-75.
105. 242 Va. 234, 409 S.E.2d 144 (1991).
106. Id. at 240, 409 S.E.2d at 147.
107. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
108. 12 Va. App. 1163, 408 S.E.2d 564 (1991).
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tion of sexual battery.1 9 In Corvin v. Commonwealth,"° the juve-
nile victim of forcible sodomy failed to report the incident for four-
teen months. The court held that the delay did not render his
testimony inherently incredible where the defendant was a juvenile
probation officer who allegedly threatened the youth with deten-
tion unless he engaged in the sexual acts before he took him
home."' Finally, in Nuckoles v. Commonwealth,"2 the court ruled
that the trial court had the authority to impose a period of incar-
ceration as a condition of suspending defendant's five-year peni-
tentiary sentence for taking indecent liberties with a minor. 113
In Archie v. Commonwealth,"4 the court of appeals affirmed the
conviction of a father's live-in girlfriend for the first degree murder
of a three-year-old girl. The evidence was circumstantial; Archie
was with the child when the fatal injuries occurred, and the inju-
ries involved considerable physical force inconsistent with the ex-
planations she offered. However, there was a size disparity inher-
ent in the difference between an adult woman and a three-year-old
girl, there was no remorse on the part of the assailant, and there
were considerable factors giving rise to a motive for the killing.115
2. Legislation
Legislation enacted in 1992 amended the juvenile code to in-
clude a broadened jurisdictional category of "family abuse," which
includes abuse against not only spouses, former spouses, parents,
children, and others generally included in the previous law, but
also in-laws, persons with whom the victim has a child in common,
and cohabiters. 116 The legislation also gives a magistrate, as well as
a judge, the power to enter an order of protection in family abuse
cases, and makes a history of family abuse a factor in child custody
and visitation cases."' The Assembly also amended the statute re-
quiring a person charged with sexual assault or child molestation
109. Id. at 1166, 408 S.E.2d at 566.
110. 13 Va. App. 296, 411 S.E.2d 235 (1991).
111. Id. at 299, 411 S.E.2d at 237.
112. 12 Va. App. 1083, 407 S.E.2d 355 (1991).
113. Id. at 1087, 407 S.E.2d at 357.
114. 14 Va. App. -, 420 S.E.2d 718 (1992).
115. Id. at -, 420 S.E.2d at 721-22.
116. Acts of Apr. 5 & Apr. 15, 1992, chs. 742, 886, 1992 Va. Acts 1129, 1664 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-138, 16.1-228, -241, -253.1, -253.2, -253.4, -278.14, -278.15, -279.1,
18.2-57.2, 19.2-81.3, 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
117. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.4, 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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to undergo HIV testing, in order to clarify the procedures," 8 and
enacted new statutes and amended others to proscribe purchase
and possession of child pornography, and the use of electronic
communications systems to facilitate child pornography." 9
An amendment also expanded the possible composition of multi-
discipline child protection teams by providing that the professions
listed should be included on the team, if practicable, but member-
ship need not be limited to those disciplines. 20 Section 63.1-248.9
of the Code was amended to provide that if the seventy-two hour
period for holding an abused or neglected child in emergency cus-
tody expires on a weekend or legal holiday, the period may be ex-
tended to the next work day, but not beyond ninety-six hours.' 2'
New legislation provides that a parent who deserts or abandons a
child will not be permitted to inherit from that child unless the
period of desertion or abandonment is terminated and the parental
relationship and duties resume until the child's death.2 2 The legis-
lature also mandated the establishment of services for substance-
abusing pregnant women in a variety of state agencies and settings
in order to enhance the health and future of children exposed to
illegal substances prior to birth.123 The child restraint laws were
broadened to apply to all motor vehicles using Virginia highways
and to increase the civil penalty for violation.1
24
B. Foster Care and Termination of Residual Parental Rights
1. Decisions
The most significant development of the past year in the area of
permanency planning for children removed from their homes was
118. Acts of Mar. 27 & Mar. 31, 1992, chs. 500, 587, 1992 Va. Acts 638, 798 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-62 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
119. Acts of Mar. 10, Apr. 5 & Apr. 4, 1992, chs. 234, 745, 699, 1992 Va. Acts 295, 1137,
1058 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-374.1, -374.1:1, -374.3 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
120. Act of Mar. 5, 1992, ch. 214, 1992 Va. Acts 273 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.6 (Cure. Supp. 1992)).
121. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 688, 1992 Va. Acts 1012 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.9 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
122. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 795, 1992 Va. Acts 1259 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
16.3 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
123. Act of Mar. 23, 1992, ch. 428, 1992 Va. Acts 548 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-
51.17:1, 32.1-127, 37.1-182.1, 54.1-2403.1 (Cure. Supp. 1992)).
124. Acts of Mar. 3 & Mar. 23, 1992, chs. 119, 405, 1992 Va. Acts 131, 511 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-1095, -1098, -1099 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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the United States Supreme Court decision in Suter v. Artist M. 125
The Court ruled that the "reasonable efforts" language of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 126 cannot be enforced
by private individuals through class action lawsuits. The legislation
in question, a major weapon in the effort to discourage long-term
placements of children in foster care and to facilitate permanency
planning for those children, requires state and local child welfare
agencies to use "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal of children
from their homes and to return them to their parents if they have
been removed. 127 The Court concluded that enforcement of this
mandate rested with the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
and not with individuals or groups through private litigation.128
An unusual number of Virginia cases involved a critical aspect of
this "reasonable efforts" requirement - the termination of
residual parental rights as a means of providing greater perma-
nency for children. In Helen W. v. Fairfax County Department of
Human Development,28 the court of appeals affirmed the termina-
tion of residual parental rights for a couple who failed to comply
with several court orders relative to their care of their multiply-
handicapped daughter, whose visits with the child were full of con-
flict and left her agitated and suicidal, who did not follow the visi-
tation time schedules, and whose paranoid personality disorders
made it very difficult for them to care for their daughter prop-
erly. 30 Likewise, in Jenkins v. Winchester Department of Social
Services,'3 the court affirmed the trial court's determination that
a mother's mental retardation prevented her from adequately car-
ing for and rearing her children and that the termination of her
rights to older children were relevant to the decision in this case.1 2
The court of appeals decided that the termination of parental
rights in Ward v. Commonwealth of Virginia Department of So-
cial Services for Alexandria 33 was supported by the evidence
125. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
127. Id.
128. Artist M, 112 S. Ct. at 1370.
129. 12 Va. App. 877, 407 S.E.2d 25 (1991).
130. Id. at 884-85, 407 S.E.2d at 29-30.
131. 12 Va. App. 1178, 409 S.E.2d 16 (1991).
132. Id. at 1183, 1186, 409 S.E.2d at 19, 21.
133. 13 Va. App. 144, 408 S.E.2d 921 (1991).
1 8151992]
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where the mother was addicted to narcotics and unable to care
properly for her son.134
In Logan v. Fairfax County Department of Human Develop-
ment,13 5 the court concluded that the family court gave adequate
consideration to the possibility of placing the child with his grand-
mother rather than giving custody to the Department, and again
ruled that patterns of behavior with other children were relevant
to the termination decision. 131 In Cage v. Harrisonburg Depart-
ment of Social Services,13 7 termination of parental rights was ap-
propriate following the mother's earlier voluntary entrustment of
the children to social services where there was no effort to remedy
the problems. 138 The court also decided that the trial court cor-
rectly refused to consider an "open adoption" approach following
termination, which would still allow contacts and visitation, be-
cause such an approach is not contemplated by the statute. 39
At least one circuit court in the past year has addressed the
standing of foster parents to seek legal custody of a child in their
physical custody pursuant to placement by a local department of
social services, where the agency attempted to remove the child
from the foster parent. In the case of In re Michael Drayton,'"1 the
court held that the foster parent had no standing, but this decision
appears to fly squarely in the face of Code section 16.1-241(A), es-
pecially that portion which says that "the authority of the juvenile
court to consider a petition involving the custody of a child shall
not be proscribed or limited where the child has previously been
awarded to the custody of a local board of social services."''
134. Id. at 149, 408 S.E.2d at 924. The court also found that it had jurisdiction over the
appeal because of the participation of the Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic Relations Dis-
trict Court in the Family Court Pilot Project, thus giving the court appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-296.1, 17-116.05 and 17-116.05:5 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
Ward, 13 Va. App. at 146, 408 S.E.2d at 922.
135. 13 Va. App. 123, 409 S.E.2d 460 (1991).
136. Id. at 132, 409 S.E.2d at 465.
137. 13 Va. App. 246, 410 S.E.2d 405 (1991).
138. Id. at 248, 410 S.E.2d at 406.
139. Id. at 249-50, 410 S.E.2d at 406-07.
140. Juvenile Appeal No. CJ-90-1097 (Arlington County Cir, Ct. June 4, 1991).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1992). Amendments to the Code in
1992 indicate that the term "legitimate interest" as used in § 20-107.2 is to "be construed
broadly to accommodate the best interests of the child." Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 585, 1992
Va. Acts 784 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)); cf. Kogon v. Ulerick,
12 Va. App. 595, 504 S.E.2d 441 (1991).
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2. Legislation
An amendment to section 16.1-282 requires a local social services
board or agency to initiate a petition to (1) return a foster child to
his home, (2) transfer custody to a relative, (3) place the child in
permanent foster care, (4) terminate parental rights, (5) or keep
custody with the board or agency, if no final action has been taken
within twenty-four months of placement, and the board or agency
is placed under a stricter mandate to engage in permanency plan-
ning.142 The Commissioner of Social Services is also directed to es-
tablish an advocacy project to assist general relief recipients and
children in foster care to apply for federal Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) benefits.143
VII. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Decisions
In Wilson v. Wilson,1 4  the court of appeals concluded that the
trial court erred (1) in granting the father joint custody and liberal
unsupervised visitation, despite concluding that many of the fa-
ther's parenting practices were inappropriate and had continued
despite court orders to the contrary, 45 and (2) in ordering that the
father would become primary custodian if the mother ever moved
out of the state."4" Any decision regarding future out-of-state
moves must be based on the best interests of the child at the time
of the move. 47 In another case, Hur v. Virginia Department of
Social Services,'48 the court ruled that an oral request for visita-
tion during a child support proceeding, unaccompanied by a peti-
tion for visitation, does not properly give notice to the other parent
or place the issue before the trial court. 49 The court also con-
cluded in Sutherland v. Sutherland151 that the fact that a mother
142. Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch. 869, 1992 Va. Acts 1631 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
282 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
143. Act of Mar. 24, 1992, ch. 170, 1992 Va. Acts 224 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
89.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
144. 12 Va. App. 1251, 408 S.E.2d 576 (1991).
145. Id. at 1252, 408 S.E.2d at 578.
146. Id. at 1255, 408 S.E.2d at 579.
147. Id. at 1256, 408 S.E.2d at 579.
148. 13 Va. App. 54, 409 S.E.2d 454 (1991).
149. Id. at 62-63, 409 S.E.2d at 459-60.
150. 14 Va. App. 42, 414 S.E.2d 617 (1992).
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:797
lived in an adulterous relationship with another man does not au-
tomatically disqualify her from custody of her child.151
B. Legislation
The General Assembly amended three sections of the Code to
broaden the categories of persons who may be considered for cus-
tody and visitation, and to further emphasize that the focus is on
the best interests of the child.152 The legislature also clarified the
ability of agencies to charge fees for services rendered in connec-
tion with custody, visitation, and support cases, including media-
tion services.1 53
VIII. ADOPTION
The court of appeals ruled in Carlton v. Pax ton15 4 that the stat-
utes providing for order of publication must be strictly adhered to
and in the absence of evidence of such adherence, an order of
adoption should have been vacated.' 55 Legislative action included
amending section 63.1-220.3 of the Code to correct the reference to
the new disposition sections of the juvenile code,' 56 and several
amendments to sections dealing with out-of-state placements and
requests for non-identifying adoption information.151
151. Id. at 43, 414 S.E.2d at 618. The court refused the invitation to pass on the contin-
ued vitality of Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977), which appeared to place
great emphasis on the influence of such adultery to child custody decisions. Brown does not
establish a per se rule; the supreme court also considered other factors highly relevant to the
best interests of the child. Sutherland, 14 Va. App. at 43, 414 S.E.2d at 618.
152. Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 585, 1992 Va. Acts 784 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-
241, -278.15, 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
153. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 554, 1992 Va. Acts 708 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
274 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
154. 14 Va. App. 105, 415 S.E.2d 600 (1992).
155. Id. at 113, 415 S.E.2d at 604.
156. Act of Mar. 3, 1992, ch. 125, 1992 Va. Acts 137 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
220.3 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
157. Act of Apr. 1, 1992, ch. 607, 1992 Va. Acts 873 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-
223, -226, -228, -229, -231, -236 (Cum. Supp. 1992)). The act repealed VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
228.1.
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IX. PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY
A. Decisions
In Shelton v. Shelton,158 the court of appeals concluded that a
child was not barred from obtaining support from her biological
father merely because the mother's former husband had been
deemed to be her father in a divorce action as neither she nor the
biological father were parties in that proceeding. 15 9 In Batrouny v.
Batrouny,160 the court affirmed the circuit court's decision to set
aside a divorce decree where the wife fraudulently misrepresented
that the husband was the father of her first child.' 61 The court
ruled in Zubricki v. Motter'6 2 that a trial court must consider a
father's support requirements for legitimate children in fixing the
amount of support the father owed to his two additional children
born to another woman to whom he was not married, even though
there was no current court order regarding support.'6 3 In Aviles v.
Aviles, 64 the court determined that a former husband could not
set aside a divorce decree that adjudged him to be the father of a
child born during the marriage, where he had filed the proceeding
and alleged the child to be his, and where he did not establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the wife had committed fraud
on the court. 165
B. Legislation
The 1992 General Assembly expanded the means for determin-
ing parentage to include "scientifically reliable genetic tests, in-
cluding blood tests,' 66 and determined that paternity proceedings
might be brought against a prisoner without requiring appoint-
ment of a committee. 67
158. 12 Va. App. 859, 406 S.E.2d 421 (1991).
159. Id. at 861, 406 S.E.2d at 422.
160. 13 Va. App. 441, 412 S.E.2d 721 (1991).
161. Id. at 443, 412 S.E.2d at 723.
162. 12 Va. App. 999, 406 S.E.2d 672 (1991).
163. Id. at 1001, 406 S.E.2d at 672 (1991).
164. - Va. App. -, 416 S.E.2d 716 (1992).
165. Id. at -, 416 S.E.2d at 719.
166. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 516, 1992 Va. Acts 660 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
49.1 to -49.4 (Cure. Supp. 1992)).
167. Act of Mar. 20, 1992, ch. 398, 1992 Va. Acts 507 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-
223 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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X. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Decisions
In Alexander v. Alexander,""8 the court concluded once again
that a trial court must go through the statutory guidelines to de-
termine the presumptive amount of support before considering
other factors, including the parties' written separation agree-
ment.1'69 Likewise, in Scott v. Scott,17 0 the court ruled that a sepa-
ration agreement between divorcing parents could not divest a
court of its power to set child support, although the judge may use
the guidelines to establish the presumptive amount of support and
then look at the agreement to deviate from the guidelines if justi-
fied by guideline factors.' 7 1 In Watkinson v. Henley,12 it was de-
termined that the judge must take the child support provided in
the divorce decree into account when determining whether to mod-
ify support downward. The process in such a case for modification
should be to determine whether the statutorily presumptive
amount would be unjust or inappropriate. 73 Similarly, in Kelley v.
Kelley,174 a property settlement agreement in which the wife
waived the right to child support and agreed to repay her husband
for any amounts ordered in exchange for a property transfer was
held unenforceable as against public policy. 7 5
In Milligan v. Milligan,17 6 the court concluded that a trial court
erred by requiring the wife to show a material change in circum-
stances since the prior award even though she demonstrated a wide
variance between the support being paid and the guideline amount
in Virginia Code section 20-108.2. There is no need to prove a
change in circumstances as a condition precedent to review of a
previous award in light of the support guidelines, even where that
168. 12 Va. App. 691, 406 S.E.2d 666 (1991).
169. Id. at 695, 406 S.E.2d at 668. The court also concluded that the trial court did not
err in refusing to hold the father in contempt although he had paid no child support since
May, 1989, where he had been the sole support of the children living with him, and where
he had made payments into an escrow account controlled by his attorney since the filing of
the show cause motion. Id. at 696, 406 S.E.2d at 669.
170. 12 Va. App. 1245, 408 S.E.2d 579 (1991).
171. Id. at 1249, 408 S.E.2d at 582.
172. 13 Va. App. 151, 409 S.E.2d 470 (1991).
173. Id. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 474.
174. 13 Va. App. 424, 412 S.E.2d 465 (1991), reh'g granted, Jan. 27, 1992.
175. Id. at 426-27, 412 S.E.2d at 466.
176. 12 Va. App. 982, 407 S.E.2d 702 (1991).
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award preceded the effective date of the guidelines.177 In
Buchanan v. Buchanan,'17 reversible error was committed by the
trial court in deviating from the presumptive amount in the child
support guidelines without making written findings to explain the
deviation and why the guidelines were deemed unjust or inappro-
priate.1 9 Child support guidelines cannot be retroactively applied
to determine a father's debt for past public assistance paid for
benefit of the child accruing before guidelines were in effect, ac-
cording to Morris v. Commonwealth of Virginia Department of
Social Services.180 Likewise, the court decided in Powers v. Com-
monwealth of Virginia Department of Social Services'' that a di-
vorce decree could not limit a parent's legal responsibility for pub-
lic assistance paid on behalf of a child.
In Antonelli v. Antonelli,8 2 the Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and ruled the trial court did not err in
denying the husband's petition for a reduction in child support
based on a career change that lowered his income. The trial court
denied the petition solely because of a determination that the
change was "voluntary.1183 The trial court applied the proper stan-
dard of proof in holding, at least implicitly, that the risk of success
of the career move must be on the father and not on the chil-
dren." 4 Similarly, in Hur v. Virginia Department of Social Ser-
vices,l s1 the trial court properly imputed higher income to an
under-employed father who was engaged in a lackluster college ca-
reer with no concrete plans for future employment.
In Sutherland v. Sutherland,'s it was decided that a trial court
need not consider the wife's interest in recently inherited real es-
tate in fixing child support in the absence of proof of any income
177. Id. at 988, 407 S.E.2d at 705.
178. 14 Va. App. 53, 415 S.E.2d 237 (1992).
179. Id. at 56-57, 415 S.E.2d at 239.
180. 13 Va. App. 77, 84-85, 408 S.E.2d 588, 593 (1991). The court also said that the doc-
trine of laches may not be set up against the Commonwealth acting in its official capacity,
and that giving a person notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to final adjudication of
indebtedness for past public assistance satisfies the requirements of due process. Id. at 84,
408 S.E.2d at 592-93.
181. 13 Va. App. 309, 411 S.E.2d 230 (1991).
182. 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991).
183. Id. at 154, 409 S.E.2d at 118.
184. Id. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 119-20.
185. 13 Va. App. 54, 409 S.E.2d 454 (1991).
186. 14 Va. App. 42, 414 S.E.2d 617 (1992).
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from that source.187 A trial court properly treated a home equity
credit line drawn on by the wife for a child's educational expenses
as a lien on the property to be paid by both parties in the case of
Amburn v. Amburn. 88 The court of appeals concluded, in Zubricki
v. Motter, 89 that a court must consider a father's support obliga-
tions to his legitimate children in fixing a support award for chil-
dren born out of wedlock. 90 The court also found that the trial
court erred in imputing income to the father based on unauthenti-
cated wage statements, as such statements are inadmissible
hearsay. 9'
B. Legislation
The General Assembly enacted legislation specifying that no
person may be required to obtain child support services from social
services as a condition to filing a juvenile court petition, 92
amended the child support guidelines to include higher monthly
incomes and to exclude SSI benefits from gross income and ad-
dress out-of-state obligors, 193 provided that the guidelines create a
rebuttable presumption of the correct amount of child support and
requiring the department to make written findings to rebut the
presumptions, 9" applied the child support guidelines to split or
shared custody cases based on a formula, 95 and dealt with the pro-
ration of child support payments among several obligees. 6
187. Id. at 44, 414 S.E.2d at 619.
188. 13 Va. App. 661, 666, 414 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1992).
189. 12 Va. App. 999, 406 S.E.2d 672 (1991).
190. Id. at 1001, 406 S.E.2d at 672.
191. Id. at 1001-02, 406 S.E.2d at 673-74.
192. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 527, 1992 Va. Acts 669 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-
260, 63.1-250.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
193. Act of Apr. 4, 1992, ch. 716, 1992 Va. Acts 1085 (codified at §§ 16.1-278.15, 20-107.2,
-108.1, -108.2, 34-34, 51.1-102, 51.1-802, 63.1-250.1, -251, -256, -270 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
194. Act of Mar. 2, 1992, ch. 79, 1992 Va. Acts 79 (codified at §§ 20-108.2, 63.1-264.2
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
195. Act of Apr. 4, 1992, ch. 716, 1992 Va. Acts 1085 (codified at §§ 20-108.1, -108.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1992)).
196. Act of Mar. 5, 1992, ch. 199, 1992 Va. Acts 256 (codified at §§ 20-60.3, 63.1-251.2
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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XI. EDUCATION
A. Decisions
Once again, most of the decided cases in the field of education
involved the schooling of handicapped children. An exception was
the Supreme Court decision in the case of Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 197 which concluded that a damages remedy
was available' 9 in an action to enforce Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972."'9 In a special education case, School Board
of County of York v. Nicely,200 the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled
that the one-year "catch-all" limitations period for personal ac-
tions, rather than the Administrative Process Act's thirty-day limi-
tation, applies to a special education appeal from a school board's
action. 20 1 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that annual
grade promotion is not the proper gauge for attainment of a "free
appropriate public education" although Maryland law may estab-
lish a higher floor for the level of educational services to handi-
capped children,20 2 and the same court concluded that a teacher
with a learning disability may be "otherwise qualified" for the po-
sition of a school teacher under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act with regard to her difficulty in passing the National Teachers
Examination.20 3 In Doyle v. Arlington County School Board,2 °4 the
court ruled that district courts should give greater deference to the
factual findings of a state administrative hearing officer than to
those reached by the state reviewing officer, and in Carter v. Flo-
rence County School District Four,0 5 the court determined that
the unaccredited status of a private school for handicapped stu-
dents is not a bar to reimbursement of parents of such a student
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.20 6
197. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
198. Id. at 1035-37.
199. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). Although the case involved sexual abuse by a teacher,
the decision is likely to have its greatest effect in the gender discrimination area, especially
for women's sports.
200. 12 Va. App. 1051, 408 S.E.2d 545 (1991).
201. Id. at 1061, 408 S.E.2d at 550.
202. In re Conklin, 946 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991).
203. Pandazides v. Virginia Board of Education, 946 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1991).
204. 953 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1991).
205. 950 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1991).
206. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 -1485 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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B. Legislation
The General Assembly again strengthened the laws dealing with
weapons and "beepers" on school property,20 7 allowed broader ac-
cess to criminal history record information for use by school boards
in screening potential employees,20 and authorized the popular
election of local school boards pursuant to a local referendum. 20 9
XII. MENTAL HEALTH
Little action took place in the mental health arena, although the
General Assembly deleted the special confidentiality provisions
governing juvenile mental commitments,21 0 and allowed emergency
commitment hearings to be held on the next court business day if
the seventy-two hour period expires on a weekend or holiday, with
no extension beyond ninety-six hours. 21'
XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Program was ruled to be constitutional by the Virginia Supreme
Court in King v. Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Com-
pensation Program.11 2
207. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 738, 1992 Va. Acts 1126 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-
279, -280, -282, -308.1, -322.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
208. Act of Apr. 4, 1992, ch. 718, 1992 Va. Acts 1100 (codified at § 19.2-389 (Cum. Supp.
1992)).
209. Act of Apr. 1, 1992, ch. 594, 1992 Va. Acts 852 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-
57.1 through -57.5 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
210. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 539, 1992 Va. Acts 679 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-
337, -341, -344, and -345 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
211. Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch. 884, 1992 Va. Acts 1661 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
340 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
212. 242 Va. 404, 410 S.E.2d 656 (1991).
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